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AIRLINES, AIRPORTS AND ANTITRUST:
A PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR
ENHANCED COMPETITION
ROBERT M. HARDAWAY*
PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY**

I.

INTRODUCTION

P RIOR TO DEREGULATION, the consensus among
many economists was that removal of governmental
barriers to entry and pricing for airlines would result in a
healthy competitive environment, one perhaps approaching that of perfect competition.I Destructive competition,
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I See Michael E. Levine, The Legacy of Airline Deregulation: Public Benefits, But New
Problems, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 161, 161. In an environment of perfect competition, no single producer has market power and "consumers purchase goods and services closely approximating their marginal costs of
production." Id. In such a market, "there is no input waste, excess capacity, or
'monopoly' profit[s]." In theory, "[t]he most efficient producers provide the commodity or service[s], and the public enjoys an efficient allocation of resources."
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whose purported existence gave birth to regulation of
these two industries in the 1930s, was deemed unlikely to
occur. 2 It was predicted that concentration was highly unlikely, for new entry would keep the industry hotly
competitive.
Paul S. Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation: Monopoly I$ the Name of the
Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505, 535 n.182 (1987).
2 A 1978 Senate Committee report on federal regulation provided a fairly typical summary of those attributes of destructive competition deemed not likely to
surface in a deregulated air and motor carrier industry:
A justification sometimes offered for regulation is that in the absence of regulation competition would be "destructive." In other
words, without regulation, an industry might operate at a loss for
long periods ....
When there is excess capacity in a competitive
industry ... prices can fall far below average cost. This is because
individual producers minimize their losses by continuing to produce
so long as their variable (avoidable) costs are covered, since they
would incur their fixed (overhead) costs whether they produced or
not ....
Similarly, if resources are mobile [as they are in the trucking and airline industries,] depressed conditions in an industry or a
region would result in the shift of resources to other employments
What is "destructive" about large and long-lasting losses? Some
economists have suggested that they would result in long periods of
inadequate investment and slow technical progress which in turn
might lead to poor service and periodic shortages ....
Another scenario that has sometimes been suggested is that periods of large losses will result in wholesale bankruptcies and the
shakeout of many small producers with the result that the industry in
question becomes highly concentrated in a few large firms ....
A third and related notion is the possibility that powerful firms
might engage in predation ....
"Destructive competition" seems .. . unlikely in the cases of airlines and trucks.
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1978).
1 Although almost every airline opposed deregulation in 1978, the nation's
largest carrier, United Airlines, was a vigorous proponent. Alfred Kahn has admitted that, in advocating deregulation, he had underestimated the advantages of
the large firms in the airline industry. Hearings Before the California Public Utilities Comm., at 6190, 6223 Uan. 31, 1989) (testimony of Alfred E. Kahn) [hereinafter Kahn Oral Testimony]. As Kahn said, "We underestimated the importance of
economies of scale and scope." Id. Elsewhere, Kahn has conceded, "We advocates of deregulation were misled by the apparent lack of evidence of economies
of scale .... " Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS
316, 318 (1988) [hereinafter Surprises of Airline Deregulation]. Kahn also admitted, "We underestimated the ease of entry on the national level by new carriers."
Kahn Oral Testimony, supra, at 6205. So it must have come as quite a shock when
large firms came to dominate the industry. A decade ago, Kahn dismissed fears
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Transportation, however, has turned out not to be the
that the industry would become highly concentrated. Testifying before a House
Subcommittee in 1978, Congressman Harsha posed the following question:
[Y]ou are going to invite into the area of new entry the severest competition between airlines serving that particular market and ultimately the big will eat the little, and those who are able to withstand
the severe competition and the reduced fares-even below operating expenses-will prevail. Then the airlines that cannot prevail, of
course, will have to either go out of business or do something else.
After that transition period then you are going to see the air fares
go back up again and the big will control the airline industry.
Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearingson H.R. 11145 Before the Subcomm. on Action of the
House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1978).
Kahn dismissed these fears as unfounded. He remarked:
First, the assumption that you are going to get really intense, severe, cut throat competition just seems to me unrealistic when you
are talking about a relatively small number of carriers who meet one
another in one market after another. We don't find in American industry generally when you have a few relatively large carriers competing with one another that they engage in bitter and extended
price wars.
But number two, the fear that the big will eat the little, that is one
that I would really like to nail. If you look, as I did last week, at the
stock market prices of the securities of the big airlines today you will
find that while the average certificated carriers in the United States
stock is selling at about two-thirds of book value.., three of the five
biggest carriers ... stock is selling at 33 to 37 percent of book value
That means to me the investors do not believe that prediction.
Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in 1977 hearings before a House Subcommittee, Kahn said, "I do not
honestly believe that the big airlines are going to be able to wipe out the smaller
airlines, if only because every study we have ever made seems to show that there
are not economies of scale." Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings on H.R. 11145
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1137 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 House Hearings].
New entry in the airline industry has become extremely difficult, and mergers
and bankruptcies stimulated by the worst economic period in the industry's history have thinned the ranks of competitors and created high levels of concentration. Of the 121 small airlines which entered after 1978, fewer than fifty are still
operating. Focus: A Decade of Deregulation, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 5, 1988, at Supp.
A. [hereinafter Deregulation Focus]. Kahn recently characterized the failure rate
of new airlines as "frightening." Alfred E. Kahn, TransportationDeregulation... and
All That, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1987, at 91, 93. Whether considered individually or collectively, their share of the domestic passenger market is relatively insignificant. Moreover, since promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
the airline industry has become a national oligopoly, and in many markets, a monopoly.
In a 1988 article in the Transportation Law Journal, Alfred Kahn admitted that
prices are likely to rise, saying, "I have little doubt that ... the disappearance of
most of the price-cutting new entrants and the marked reconcentration of the in-
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ideal model of perfect competition that many proponents
of deregulation insisted it was. There appear to be significant economies of scale, scope and density, 4 and economic barriers to entry in the airline industry.
Widespread bankruptcies and mergers have reduced the
number of competitors to the point that major oligopolies
now exist. Large airlines now dominate the infrastructure
of airports, their gates and landing slots, as well as comdustry - will produce higher fares .... Alfred E. Kahn, Airline Deregulation - A
Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 229, 236 (1988); see also
Tom Hamburger, Fares Rose with NWA's Dominance, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec.
23, 1988, at A9. Similarly, in testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee
in 1987, Kahn said, "the industry has become more concentrated at the national
level because of mergers and airline failures, and that means in my judgment that
price competition may well become less severe in the years ahead." Safety and
Regulation of the Airline Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1987) [hereinafter Safety and
Regulation].
4 Economies of scale are realized when a firm increases its total production
while simultaneously decreasing its cost to produce each unit. As the scale of
production grows, the enterprise becomes more efficient. The classic example of
the phenomenon of economies of scale is the enormous cost savings experienced
from producing automobiles on an assembly line rather than one car at a time.
The cost savings resulting from economies of scale can be attributed to: (1) indivisibility - a large capital-intensive piece of equipment operates most efficiently
at full capacity; and (2) division and specialization of labor - highly specialized
labor is more productive labor. Hub and spoke operations in the airline industry
are largely successful because of significant economies of scale.
A related concept to economies of scale is economies of scope. A firm achieves
economies of scope by combining one or more activities into a single operation.
Thus, the additional cost of producing one more item (marginal cost) is diminished when the scope of activity broadens. Thus, scheduled service can easily
gobble up charter service. See JoE BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION 56
(1956); ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS ExPLAINED 53
(1982); W. SHEPARD, ECE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1979).
Another related concept is economies of density. By combining passengers and
groups of passengers, an airline can carry the aggregation of passengers more
cheaply than if it carried those passengers separately. Through careful scheduling
of flights, consolidating operations and routing passengers through its "hub," an
airline streamlines its system, making it more dense and thus more efficient. The
"hub and spoke" scheme employed by all of the major airlines is testimony to this
phenomenon. For example, an airline that carries 100 passengers in a single
plane to a destination as opposed to carrying 50 passengers in two aircraft to that
same destination is making use of economies of density. See generally ANN E.
FRIEDAENDER & RICHARD SPADY, FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION REGULATION: EQUITY,
EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION IN THE RAIL & TRUCKING INDUSTRIES

(1981); A. LA-

MOND, COMPETITION IN THE GENERAL-FREIGHT MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY

(1980).
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5
puter reservations systems.
The theory of contestable markets served as a major intellectual justification for deregulation. The theory posits
that if a monopolist or oligopolist begins to earn
supracompetitive profits, new competitive entry, or the
threat thereof, will restore pricing competition. If incumbents raise rates above competitive levels, new entrants
would be attracted like sharks to the smell of blood.6 The
- See generally PAUL S. DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGU-

LATION (1990) [hereinafter FLYING BLIND]; PAUL S. DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION (1989).
6 Assumptions about ease of entry and the importance

of potential entry as a
means of keeping markets competitive served as an essential foundation for airline deregulation. It is doubtful that Congress would have promulgated the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 if it had known that the ultimate result would be an
oligopoly.
But even assuming a high level of concentration, deregulation theory had a solution. In the late 1970s, Kahn proclaimed:
[A]lmost all of this industry's markets can support only a single carrier or a few: their natural structure, therefore, is monopolistic or
oligopolistic. This kind of structure could still be conducive to
highly effective competition if only the government would get out of
the way; the ease of potential entry into those individual markets,
and the constant threat of its materializing, could well suffice to prevent monopolistic exploitation.
Alfred E. Kahn, Address Before the New York Society of Security Analysts (Feb. 2,
1978), at 24. Kahn saw few economies of scale in the industry; hence entry, or the
threat of potential entry would keep monopolists from extracting monopoly profits. Id. at 26. Again, this was the essence of contestability theory. In 1977, Kahn
testified before a House Subcommittee on the importance of the automatic entry
provisions of a pending airline deregulation bill, saying:
[A] realistic threat of entry by new and existing carriers on the initiation of management alone is the essential element of competition.
It is only this threat that makes it possible to leave to managements a wider measure of discretion in pricing. It is the threat of
entry that will hold excessive price increases in check.
1977 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 1111. Kahn advanced the theory on many
occasions while Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Before another House
Committee in 1977, Kahn testified, "Were it not for Government restrictions, entry would be relatively easy .... Economic Aspects of Federal Regulation in the Transportation Industry: Hearings Before the Task Force on Tax Expenditures, Government
Organization,andRegulation of the House Comm. on the Budget, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1977).
In a recent interview, Alfred Kahn noted, "Certainly one of the assumptions
behind airline deregulation was that entry would be relatively easy." Interview
with Alfred E. Kahn, ANTITRUST, Fall 1988, at 4, 6 [hereinafter Kahn Interview].
But in another instance, Kahn admitted, "We didn't dream of the way airlines
could manipulate fares with such great sophistication .... We were a little naive
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theory is premised upon the belief that economic barriers
to entry and economies of scale in the airline industry are
about what 'freedom of entry' meant in the airline business." Robert Kuttner,
Why Air Fares Aren't Falling, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1988, at C7.

On the one hand, Kahn still appears to embrace the theory of contestability. In
the 1988 reprinting of his book, he said, "all travelers continue to have the protection - admittedly in varying degrees of effectiveness - of the relatively high degree of contestability of airline markets, and of the ability of many travelers to
larger towns, where a greater variety of fares is typically available." ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION VII (19th ed. 1988). In his article in the

Transportation Law Journal, Kahn said:
I have no recollection that in expressing the expectation that the
possibility of entry would prevent grossly monopolistic exploitation,
the advocates of deregulation clearly distinguished the roles they expected would be played, respectively, by totally new entrants and by
existing carriers invading one another's markets. Manifestly, however, it is irrational to conclude, from the unlikelihood of the former,
that the anticipated effectiveness of contestability has therefore been
disproved.
Kahn, supra note 3, at 233 n.8.
But in testimony delivered in 1987 before a Subcommittee of the Senate judiciary Committee, Kahn was far less enthusiastic about the potential benefits of
contestability:
I attack the easy assumption of the ideologues of laissez-faire that
contestability takes care of everything; that private parties cannot
monopolize airline markets because the minute they raise their price
two bits, there will be a rush of competitors into the market.
I know of seven studies now of airline pricing since deregulation.
They all conclude that while, yes, airline markets are relatively easy
to enter, the potential entry of competitors is no substitute for competitors already there ....
Now, the view that contestability of airline markets makes antitrust
enforcement unnecessary is very close to the position that DOT is
taking [in the airline merger cases].
Contestability is not a sufficient protection, in my opinion, and anybody who looks at the airline industry certainly knows that the likelihood and opportunity of entry, particularly by new carriers-lowcost, price-cutting carriers-has greatly diminished in recent years
and is likely to remain much lower than before,
Airline Deregulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1987) [hereinafter

Airline Deregulation]. Recently, Kahn was again quite critical of the theory of
contestability:
To return to my schizophrenia thesis, life is much simpler for the
economists and lawyers who believe that the mere incantation of
"contestability" holds the answer to all possible concerns about the
viability of competition in deregulated industries. According to this
view-seldom articulated as baldly as I will here-the comparative
ease of entry that helped recommend deregulation of the airline and
trucking industries also makes antitrust not very important ....

In
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relatively modest. Even the threat of entry would be sufficient to discipline the market and restore the competitive
equilibrium.7
Contestability has not served as a significant competitive catalyst in the deregulated airline industry, and has
since been abandoned by the Justice Department, which
now regulates airline mergers. Because of formidable
barriers to entry, many airlines are now able to exert market power in the markets which they dominate.' With the
creation of frequent flyer programs, travel agent commission overrides, and megacarrier dominance in fortress
hubs and computer reservations systems, the entry of new
carriers is highly unlikely today. In a situation where market power exists, prices rise and the level of service can
deteriorate; excessive wealth is transferred from consumers to producers, and society's resources are misallocated.
As consumers purchase alternative products or services it
costs society more to produce.
II.
A.

DEREGULATION AND CONCENTRATION
THE SHORT TERM-LONG TERM PICTURE OF
COMPETITION

During the first decade of deregulation, the airline inshort, if contestability were perfect, there would be no need for antitrust laws at all ....
In my opinion, the contestability of airline markets does not afford
travelers sufficient protection in those circumstances ....
It seems
to me absolutely incontestable that the likelihood of entry into any
industry is itself powerfully affected by the previous practices of the
incumbent firms. The recent history of the airline industry provides
ample documentation of that proposition. Entry, particularly by
genuinely new firms, has clearly become much more difficult ....
Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1061-63 (1987).
7 See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
8 As we shall see, increased concentration results in higher ticket prices for consumers. After the TWA/Ozark merger, prices rose between 13% and 18% on
trips from or to its St. Louis hub. After the Northwest/Republic merger, prices
rose between 18% and 40% at its Minneapolis/St. Paul hub. Paul S. Dempsey, It's
Time to Regulate the Airlines, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 1989, at 21-A.
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dustry suffered the worst economic losses in its history. 9
This period of economic anemia began before the onset
of economic recession in the early 1980s and ascending
fuel prices, and continued steadfastly.' 0 While the bottom
line has recently improved as the industry has become
highly concentrated, its average annual net profit margin
over the last eleven years has been a meager 0.7%, compared with 4.5% for other American industries."
9 William Stockton, When Eight CarriersCall the Shots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988,
at 3-1.
10 See Paul S. Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation - On a Collision Course?, 13
TRANSP. LJ. 329, 342-52 (1984).
1 James Ott, Industry Officials Praise Deregulation, But Cite Flaws, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Oct. 31, 1988, at 88. In 1988, the industry's profit margin shrunk to
1.3%, compared to 2% a decade earlier. See Stockton, supra note 9. Alfred Kahn
maintains that the airline industry's profit margin "fell to a puny 0.10 in the 197987 period." Surprises of Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 316 n.l. As one careful
observer of the airline industry, Melvin Brenner, noted:
The eight years of deregulation comprise the worst financial period in airline history. The cumulative industry operations in those
eight years generated a loss of over $7 billion, when interest payments are included with operating expenses .... The deregulation
era is the first time that the industry as a whole has recorded a cumulative loss over an eight-year period ....
The principal cause of the poor financial results has been the tendency of airlines to engage in destructive competition in the absence
of regulation - a tendency evident particularly in excess capacity
and fare wars . . . . By failing to cover fixed costs, marginal cost
reliance jeopardizes the industry's long term viability.
Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation - A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16
TRANSP. L.J. 179, 200-01 (1988). Ten years after he implemented airline deregulation as President Carter's Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Alfred Kahn
admitted, "There is no denying that the profit record of the industry since 1978
has been dismal, that deregulation bears substantial responsibility, and that the
proponents of deregulation did not anticipate such financial distress - either so
intense or so long-continued." Kahn, supra note 3, at 248. After five years of
deregulation, with carriers going "belly up" in bankruptcy, in an interview published in the Wall Street Journal, Kahn noted that "there's a lot of turmoil, but
that's what we intended." Bill Richards, CAB's Ex-Chairman, Alfred Kahn, Looks At
Airline Industry He Helped to Deregulate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1983, at 35. He then
acknowledged that "the turmoil is more intense and lasting longer than most of us
anticipated." He was also willing to concede that the new entrants would likely
never account "for more than 5% of the total travel." Id. But Kahn then expressed surprise with the magnitude of the turmoil, saying in 1983, "I've been
dismayed because the airlines suffered more pain than I envisioned." Stroller, Al
Kahn Has Few Regrets, AIRPORT PRESS, Aug. 1983, at 1. In 1987 hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee Kahn acknowledged that deregulation "caused a
great deal of turmoil-more, I think, than most of us would have predicted. Tur-
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In the short run, more than 120 new airlines appeared,
although most were small, commuter lines.' 2 This flood
of entry caused pricing to spiral downward. While a short
term boon for consumers, the pricing competition which
emerged from deregulation was an unmitigated catastrophe for the airline industry. In the long run, more than
in
200 airlines have ceased operations or been acquired
4
mergers, 13 and only seventy-four carriers remain.'
In one important sense, the economic characteristics of
transportation differ from those of most other sectors of
the economy and make it inherently vulnerable to overcapacity. If a manufacturer or retailer suffers a period of
slack demand, it can usually store unsold inventory and
sell it another day, when demand improves. In contrast,
transportation firms sell what is, in essence, an instantly
perishable commodity. Once an aircraft taxis down the
runway, any unused capacity is lost forever. Empty seats
cannot be warehoused and sold another day as could, say,
canned beans. It is as if a grocer was faced with spoilage
moil has, however, socially positive as well as painful aspects: a release of creativity,entrepreneurship and innovation, along with a painful readjustments,
bankruptcies and unprecedented financial losses." Airline Deregulation, supra note
6, at 67. Kahn recently said, "I found it distressing in the middle of this. I hated
to be responsible for the industry suffering so. I wanted to be sure that it would
always be financially healthy and able to attract capital." Kahn Oral Testimony, supra
note 3, at 6247-48. He acknowledged that the low fares consumers had enjoyed
were a short-term phenomenon, saying, "I have little doubt that ... the disappearance of most of the price-cutting new entrants and the marked reconcentration of the industry - will produce higher fares." Id.
12 Christopher Power, The Frenzied Skies, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 1988, at 70, 72.
IsJeff Pelline, Bumpy Ride Under Deregulation, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 28,
1988, at 21. One source estimates that 214 airlines have disappeared from the
market. Martha Hamilton, Is the Airline Industry on the Verge of Going Global?, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 1988, at KI.
'4 Pelline, supra note 13, at 21. In the Darwinian scramble for survival and market share unleashed by deregulation, hundreds of carriers have gone "belly up" in
bankruptcy or been absorbed by the megacarriers, including such darlings of deregulation as Air Florida, Freddie Laker's Skytrain, and Donald Burr's People Express. Alfred Kahn once pointed to these new upstart airlines as evidence that
deregulation was a brilliant success. But they have all since dropped from the
skies into a social Darwinist grave. America West, Presidential, and Midway remain, but they have a relatively insignificant share of the domestic air transport
market. A rash of mergers and bankruptcies has turned the industry into a national oligopoly, and in many hubs and city-pairs, a virtual or actual monopoly.
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of all its canned goods on a daily basis - as if they had the
properties of open jars of unrefrigerated mayonnaise. He
would be forced to have a fire sale every afternoon. This
inevitably leads to distress sale pricing during weak demand periods, or when excess capacity created by unlimited entry abounds. Hence, the vicissitudes of the market
cycle are particularly brutal for transportation.
In the short run, the pressure of overcapacity has a
downward impact upon profitability as carriers scramble
to lower prices to fill empty seats. In order to establish
itself as a viable competitor, most carriers find they must
carve out a geographic territory (usually a region, or cluster of city pairs), lease gates, and provide the number of
frequencies sufficient to satisfy business passenger demand. The short term marginal cost of adding another
passenger to a scheduled flight is nil - printing another
ticket, adding another meal, a few drops of additional
fuel. Any ticket sold makes some contribution. Hence,
strong incentives exist to sell empty seats for whatever
will lure a bottom to fill them.' 5 Carriers competing head
to head spiral downward in destructive competition. In
such circumstances, while carriers cover short-term marginal costs, fixed costs are necessarily ignored.
These characteristics of air transport created distress
sale pricing in the early 1980s. While a bonanza for passengers, the first decade of deregulation was the darkest
financial period in the history of domestic aviation. To
survive, carriers had no choice but to slash wages, trim
service and maintenance, and defer new aircraft
purchases.
Airlines perceived that they needed monopoly opportunities to stem the economic brutality of destructive competition, so they merged and developed hub-and-spoke
systems, giving them regional and city-pair market power.
Hubbing is the dominant megatrend on the deregulation
15 The difficulty airlines face is in managing yield in a way which lures only
passengers not otherwise likely to fly; hence, Saturday stay-over requirements,
which are unappealing to business travelers.
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landscape. Hubbing allows airlines to bring a number of
flights from spoke cities into a central hub airport, interchange the traffic, and send the flights out to their final
destinations several times a day. Hub domination allows
airlines to raise prices significantly above competitive
levels for passengers who begin or end their trips at the
hub.
It is natural for firms facing extinction to seek out or
create monopoly market opportunities to afford them the
market power to raise prices. Thus, the large number of
industry bankruptcies and mergers, and the growth of national and regional (hub) concentration, owe their existence to the destructive competition unleashed by
deregulation. 16
B.

NATIONAL CONCENTRATION

Of the 121 small airlines which entered after 1978,
fewer than fifty are still operating, and they are quite
small.1 7 Whether considered individually or collectively,
the small airlines' share of the domestic passenger market
is relatively insignificant. Since promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, all but four hub airports
have come to be dominated by a single airline (three with
Eastern's demise). Today, the overwhelming number of
city-pairs are monopolies or duopolies.
Fifty-one mergers and acquisitions were consummated
between 1979 and 1988. More than twenty of those were
approved by DOT after 1985, when it assumed jurisdiction over mergers.' 8 The six largest airlines increased
their passenger share from seventy-three percent in 1973
to eighty-four percent in 1986. t9 The eight largest air16 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 589.
11 Deregulation Focus, supra note 3, at Supp. A.
18 In January 1986, the five largest airlines accounted for 54% of the domestic
passenger market; by 1987, the figure had grown to 72%. Fifteen independent
airlines operating at the beginning of 1986 had been merged into six megacarriers
by the end of 1987. The mergers approved by DOT consolidated about 70% of
the nation's aircraft capacity. See Brenner, supra note 11, at 180.
'9 Id. In the short term, competition unleashed by deregulation reduced the
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lines accounted for eighty percent of the domestic market
in 1978, and ninety-two percent in 1990.20
Much criticism has been levied at the Department of
Transportation for approving every merger submitted to
it since it assumed the Civil Aeronautics Board's jurisdiction over mergers, acquisitions and consolidations (under
section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act) upon the CAB's
demise on December 31, 1984. The Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 insisted that the agency guard against "unfair,
deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive practices" and
avoid "unreasonable industry concentration, excessive
market domination" and similar occurrences which might
enable "carriers unreasonably to increase prices, reduce
services, or exclude competition."'2 But these admonitions fell on deaf ears at DOT, which never met a merger
it didn't like.
For example, DOT approved Texas Air's (i.e. Continental and New York Air) acquisition of both People Express (which included Frontier), and Eastern Airlines
22
(which included Braniff's Latin American routes);
dominance by the largest airlines. Thus, in January, 1986, the five largest airlines
accounted for 54.3% of the domestic passenger market. But by June of 1987,
after a series of unprecedented mergers, their share had soared to 72.2%. Dempsey, supra note 1,at 543.
20 Deregulation Focus, supra note 3, at Supp. D (updated by Happiness Is a Cheap
Seat, EcONOMiST, Feb. 4, 1989, at 68). In contrast, in 1977, the ten largest airlines

accounted for 89% of the market. Ott, supra note. 11, at 89. One commentator
summarized the structural changes in the industry that have occurred since promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978:
The 11 major airlines have shrunk to eight; the eight former local
service carriers are now two and they are trying to merge; the eight
original low-cost charter airlines have been reduced to one, through
bankruptcy and abandonment; 14 former regional airlines have
shrunk to only four; over 100 new upstart airlines were certificated
by the CAB and about 32 got off the ground and most of those
crashed, leaving only a handful still operating; of the 50 top commuters in existence in 1978, 29 have disappeared ....
Airline Deregulation, supra note 6, at 61-62 (testimony of Morten S. Beyer).
Today, the top 50 commuter carriers who constitute 90% of that industry are
captives of the major carriers, in part or in total owned, controlled, and financed
by the giant airlines and relegated to serving the big airlines at their hubs. Id.
21 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1988).
See The Rise & Fall of the CAB, at 135.
22 DOT did require that some shuttle routes be sold off in the northeastern
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United's acquisition of Pan Am's transpacific routes;
American's acquisition of Air Cal; Delta's acquisition of
Western; Northwest's acquisition of Republic (itself a
product of the mergers of North Central, Southern and
Hughes Airwest); TWA's acquisition of Ozark; and
USAir's acquisition of PSA and Piedmont. The major
mergers which have been consummated since deregula23
tion are graphically depicted on the following chart:
CHART I - MAJOR AIR CARRIER MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS,
PURCHASES AND CONSOLIDATIONS SINCE PROMULGATION OF
THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
MARKET SHARE*

AMERICAN
" American ....................
" Air Cal ......................
UNITED
" U nited ......................
* Pan Am (transpacific routes)...
DELTA
* D elta ........................
" W estern .....................
TEXAS AIR
" Texas International ...........
" Continental ..................
* New York Air ................
* People Express/Frontier ......
" B ritt ........................
" PBA .........................
* Eastern/Braniff (Latin America)
* Rocky Mountain ..............

1987

1988

1989

1990

13.8

15.2

16.6

17.4

16.9

16.4

16.2

16.9

12.2

12.0

13.3

13.5

19.0

19.3

15.9

13.1

corridor, but otherwise the Eastern acquisition by Texas Air passed through unmolested. See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 538.
213 To these mergers of passenger carriers, add the major air cargo acquisition
of Seaboard by Flying Tigers, and the recent announcement by Federal Express of
its intent to acquire Tigers, as well as the acquisition of Emery and Purolator by
CF Air. Moreover, concentration levels in the passenger industry are even more
pronounced when one recognizes that before deregulation, America had a healthy
charter airline industry, and enjoyed significant market share. Under deregulation, it has very nearly vanished. See Brenner, supra note 11, at 184. In 1977, nonscheduled airlines had 43,000 domestic departures, compared with 18,000 in
1986.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF CER-

TIFICATED ROUTE CARRIERS

798-800 (1986);

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF CERTIFICATED ROUTE CARRIERS

747-49 (1977).
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NORTHWEST
8.9
9.6
11.6
10.3
* Northwest ...................
* Republic/North Central .......
* Southern ....................
* Hughes Airwest ..............
USAIR
8.2
7.2
7.2
7.1
* U SA ir .......................
* PSA .........................
• Piedmont/Empire ............
* H enson ......................
TWA
7.7
7.2
7.4
8.2
* TW A ........................
• Ozark .......................
PAN AM
6.9
5.9
7.1
6.3
* Pan Am .....................
* N ational .....................
* Ransom e ....................
* Percentage market share as measured by revenue passenger miles. Sources:
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 40; WALL ST.J., Mar. 10, 1989, at A8; and AVIATION DAILY, July 13, 1990, at 85. Figures for 1990 are for the first six months of
that year only.

Nor are these likely to be the last of the mergers. Carl
Icahn, who owns TWA, has announced that he would like
to purchase another airline.24 But TWA may itself be
shrinking, for its fleet is the oldest in the industry, and
until March, 1989, it had no new aircraft on order.2 5 Pan
Am has been mentioned as ripe for acquisition or bankruptcy. So to stay aloft, Pan Am has already cannibalized
its transpacific routes and aircraft, its Inter-Continental
Hotel chain, and its Manhattan skyscraper.
Eastern entered bankruptcy in early 1989. Even before
bankruptcy, Eastern was the incredibly shrinking airline,
announcing the sale of its east coast shuttle to Donald
Trump, and selling its computer reservations system and
other valuable assets to firms controlled by Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air.26
24 Judith Valente, Icahn Wants To Purchase Another Airline, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
1988, at A4.
25 Happiness Is a Cheap Seat, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1989, at 71 [hereinafter A Cheap
Seat].
26 John Schwartz et al., The Boss They Love to Hate, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1989, at
20.
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There is strong evidence that the airline industry will
become more heavily concentrated than it already is. In
1989, the three largest airlines (American, United and
Delta) accounted for more than ninety percent of the
profits of the major, publicly held carriers. 27 American itself accounted for twenty-two percent of the operating
revenue and forty-three percent of the profits.28
At the same time, four major airlines (Continental,
Eastern, Pan Am and TWA) have a negative debt-to-equity ratio, and several have been deemed by industry experts to be on the endangered species list. 29 In 1989,
three of these carriers (TWA, Eastern, and Continental)
accounted for two-thirds of the major airline's interest expenses. 30 More than eight percent of TWA's and Eastern's operating expenses is devoted to interest payment,
effectively wiping out operating profit.3 1 As of December
31, 1989, Pan Am had a negative net worth of nearly a
billion dollars.32
These four anemic airlines combined, account for
twenty-eight percent of the passenger market.3 3 Should
they collapse, their market shares will be likely distributed
among the largest, and most profitable airlines, leaving
even more highly concentrated than it althe industry
34
ready is.
27 American Generates 22 Percent of Majors' 1989 Revenues, AVIATION DAILY, Mar.
20, 1990, at 545.
28 Id.
29 See Paul S. Dempsey, Robber Barons in the Cockpit: The Airline Industry in Turbulent
Skies, 18 TRANSP. L.J. 133, 147 (1990).
-0 TWA, AvIATION DAILY, July 25, 1990, at 155.
"1 See U.S. Major and National CarriersInterest Expenses, First Quarter 1990, AVIATION DAILY, July 30, 1990, at 192 (Figures are for the first quarter 1990.).
32 Pan Am ProjectingFirst Quarter Loss Larger than 1989 s, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 12,
1990, at 85.
3 See AVIATION DAILY, July 13, 1990, at 85. Market share statistics are based on
revenue passenger miles for the first six months of 1990.
24 With the globalization of air transport, the potential also looms for the creation of international megacarriers. Already American, JAL, and Qantas are trying
to buy 35% of Air New Zealand; British Airways has acquired British Caledonian;
SAS has purchased a large interest in Continental Airline Holdings (formerly
Texas Air); and several European airlines have bought into United's Apollo/Covia
computer reservations system. Martha Hamilton, Is the Airline Industry on the Verge
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Alfred Kahn characterized the contemporary airline environment as an "uncomfortably tight oligopoly. '35 He
has been particularly critical of the Department of Transportation's permissive approach to airline mergers, saying, "they have been permitted by a totally, and in my view
indefensibly, complacent Department of Transportation.
It is absurd to blame deregulation for this abysmal
dereliction.' '36
As previously mentioned, DOT deserves severe criticism for its abdication of antitrust responsibility to protect
the public from excessive concentration." Never before
has the United States experienced the level of concentration in aviation than we have now. National levels of concentration have risen to unprecedented levels.
of Going Global?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1988, at KI. See also Dempsey, supra note
29, at 164-67.
Liberalization of air transportation in the European Economic Community
scheduled for 1992 will likely increase levels of concentration on that side of the
Atlantic and foster more joint arrangements with U.S. carriers (although cabotage
laws prohibit more than 25% foreign ownership of U.S.-flag airlines). See PAUL S.
DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 78 (1987). See also
Paul S. Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalizationof EEC Air Transport,
53J. AIR L. & COM. 615 (1988).
By the end of the century, there may be as few as nine or ten global megacarriers, with only four or five major airlines flying the U.S. flag. Stockton, supra note
9, at 6. U.S. megacarriers already dominate the global aviation industry:
WORLD'S TOP TEN AIRLINES, 1987
AIRLINE

SCHEDULED PASSENGERS

(millions)
American Airlines
59.1
United Airlines
55.2
Eastern Airlines
44.7
Continental Airlines
39.4
TWA
24.8
British Airways
19.1
Japan Air Lines
17.9
Lufthansa
16.9
Pan American
14.8
Alitalia
14.3
Source: THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989, at 63.
35Alfred E. Kahn, Despite Waves of Airline Mergers, DeregulationHas Not Been a Failure, DENVER POST, Aug. 31, 1986, at 3G.
36 Kahn, supra note 3, at 234.
37 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 535.
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HUB AIRPORT CONCENTRATION

Before deregulation, no single airline accounted for
more than fifty percent of gates, enplanements or takeoffs
and landings at any major airport. Today, more than
twenty major airports are dominated by a single carrier,
with more than sixty percent, seventy percent, and sometimes eighty percent of landings, takeoffs, gates, and
passengers .8
Since deregulation, all major airlines have created huband-spoke systems, funneling their arrivals and departures into and out of hub airports where they dominate
the arrivals, departures, and infrastructure.3 9 While entry
and exit regulation formerly constricted their geographic
operations, deregulation has freed airlines to leave competitive and smaller markets, and consolidate their
strength into regional hub and city-pair market monopolies and oligopolies. The destructive competitive environment of deregulation has led them to prefer monopoly
opportunities to stem the hemorrhaging of dollars, even
with the inefficiencies hub systems create by requiring
circuitous routing of relatively small aircraft. As the dust
settles upon the bankruptcies and mergers of deregulation, and the hub consolidation facilitated by unlimited
entry and exit, a horizon devoid of meaningful competition appears.
Clearly, the merger of Northwest and Republic resulted
in sharply increased levels of concentration at Minneapolis/St. Paul and Detroit; and equally clear, the same happened at St. Louis when DOT approved the merger of
18 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION 15 (1990). These include the hubs of Baltimore (51% USAir), Charlotte (76% Piedmont), Cincinnati
(68% Delta), Dayton (64% Piedmont), Detroit (64% Northwest), Houston Intercontinental (72% Texas Air), Memphis (67%, Northwest), Minneapolis/St. Paul
(82% Northwest), Nashville (60% American), Newark (65%, Texas Air), Pittsburgh (83% USAir), Salt Lake City (75% Delta), and St. Louis (82% TWA). Only
four of America's hubs are duopolies: Atlanta (95% Delta and Eastern), Chicago
(72% American and United), Dallas (87% American and Delta), and Denver (89%
Texas Air and United). Most market shares are for 1986, which explains why they
differ from those set forth in Chart III. See Brenner, supra note 11, at 190.
s9 Paul S. Dempsey, Fear of Flying Frequently, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 12.
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TWA with Ozark Airlines. But as Chart II reveals, massive
hub concentration has occurred at a large number of cities where no merger had a significant impact.
CHART II - SINGLE CARRIER CONCENTRATION AT MAJOR
AIRPORTS BEFORE AND AFTER DEREGULATION
1977

AIRPORT

Baltimore/Washington
Cincinnati
Detroit Metropolitan
Houston Intercontinental
Memphis
Minneapolis/St. Paul
Nashville Metropolitan
Pittsburgh
St. Louis-Lambert
Salt Lake City
AVERAGE
*

24.5%
35.0%
21.2%
20.4%
40.2%
45.9%
28.2%
43.7%
39.1%
39.6%

1989

USAir
Delta
Delta
Continental
Delta
Northwest
American
USAir
TWA
Western

33.8%

69.3% USAir*
78.0%o Delta"
67.3%6 Northwest
76.3o Continental
83.0o Northwest"
79.576 Northwest
62.0%o American"
86.9%6 USAir
81.3%6 TWA
83.8o Delta
77.676

includes Piedmont

* second column market share figures for Cincinnati, Memphis and Nashville are for
1988.
Sources: CONSUMER REPORTS, June 1988, at 362-67; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
AIRLINE COMPETITION 33 (1990), and AVIATION DAILY, June 29, 1990, at 628-30.

To these cities, add the excessive levels of concentration
that also have emerged in the following monopoly and
duopoly hubs as of 1989:
Atlanta (91.6% Delta and Eastern combined);
Charlotte (93.4% USAir);
Chicago O'Hare (82.4% United and American
combined);
Dallas/Ft. Worth (92.6% American and Delta
combined);
Dayton (79% USAir);
Denver (82.6% United and Continental combined);
Greensboro (64% USAir);
Raleigh/Durham (69% American); and
Syracuse (61% USAir).4°
40 AVIATION DAILY,

AIRLINE COMPETITION

June 29, 1990, at 628-30;

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

33 (1990). Also note the following market concentration

figures: Chicago Midway (65% Midway), Dallas Love (71% Southwest), Newark

1992]

AIRLINES, AIRPORTS AND ANTITRUST

473

Indeed, the explanation for significant levels of
concentration at all but Detroit, Minneapolis/St. Paul and
St. Louis is not DOT's generous approval of airline
mergers, but simply the entry and exit opportunities
unleashed by deregulation. Carriers adopting particular
cities as hubs have increased frequencies and leased more
gates, while incumbent airlines have quietly exited in
favor of market dominance opportunities of their own in
other hub airports. 4 Alfred Kahn is therefore wrong.
Freedom to enter and exit markets is the very heart of
deregulation, and it is more responsible for concentration
at more hub airports than is the DOT's abysmal
dereliction.42 The CAB would likely not have approved
the widespread entry and abandonments which produced
this massive hub concentration. Nonetheless, the DOT's
antitrust delinquency is responsible for national
concentration levels which are unacceptable, and which
dampen competition by reducing the number of
competitors in particular city-pairs.
Dr. Julius Maldutis performed a study of concentration
at the nation's fifty largest airports between 1977 and
1987, calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
for each. The HHI is the methodology employed by the
U.S. Department of Justice for determining acceptable
(65% Texas Air), and Phoenix (65.4% America West and Southwest combined).
Id. See also Brenner, supra note 11, at 190 updated and expanded in James Ott,
Congress, Airlines Reassessing Deregulation's Impact, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 163; Martha Hamilton, The Hubbing of America: Good or Bad?,
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1989, at HI.
Even Chicago O'Hare and Atlanta Hartsfield are increasingly dominated by a
single firm. In 1977, United had 29% of all boardings in Chicago; by 1988, it had
53%. Even before the bankruptcy of Eastern, Delta controlled 62% of Atlanta. Id.
As Eastern flew into bankruptcy in March of 1989, it sold its gates at
Philadelphia to USAir, giving it more than 50% of that city. Judith Valente &
Robert H. Rose, Concern Heightens About the Airline Industry's March Toward Near
Domination by Only a Few Major Carriers,WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at A10.
Since Frontier was absorbed, first by People Express and then by Continental
(Texas Air), no airport has enjoyed 'the three hub carrier competition which
theretofore existed at Denver. Dempsey, supra note 1, at 592-93.
4' See Stockton, supra note 9, at 3-6.
42 Paul S. Dempsey, Deregulation Has Spawned Abuses in Air Transport, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 21, 1988, at 147.
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levels of concentration for antitrust review. It provides a
measure based on squaring the market share of individual
firms, and adding them together. For example, a firm
with a 100% monopoly would have an HHI of 10,000.
Under the Justice Department's analysis, an HHI below
1000 is presumed unconcentrated; an HHI of between
1000 and 1800 is believed moderately concentrated; and
an HHI of above 1800 is deemed highly concentrated.
By 1987, forty of these fifty airports had an HHI above
1800; in other words 80% of these airports were highly
concentrated.43 Moreover, Dr. Maldutis calculated the
weighted average of concentration for all fifty airports,
finding that it rose from an HHI of 2215 in 1977 to 3351
in 1987. 44 This corresponds to a reduction in the number
of "effective" competitors in the average of the fifty
airports from 4.51 in 1977 to 2.85 in 1987. 45
Hub concentration translates into escalating fares.
"Passengers who live in a hub city and begin their flight
there end up paying higher fares, in some cases 50
percent more than they would have had deregulation not
occurred."146 The General Accounting Office found that
after TWA's merger with Ozark, TWA increased fares
thirteen to eighteen percent on formerly competitive
routes radiating from St. Louis.47 A similar study
compared fares in markets radiating from Minneapolis-St.
Paul in which Northwest and Republic formerly
competed, and found that rates rose between eighteen
and forty percent.48
In fifteen of the eighteen hubs in which a single carrier
controls more than fifty percent of the market, passengers
43 Safety and Re-Regulation of the Airline Industry: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1987) (statement
of Dr. Julius Maldutis, V.P. Aviation Research, Solomon Brothers).
44 Id.

15 FLYING BLIND,

supra note 5, at 17-18.

William Stockton, When Eight Carriers Call the Shots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1988, at 3-1.
16

47 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION
48 Hamburger, supra note 3, at IA.

2, 3 (1988).
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pay significantly more than the industry norm. 4 9 Before
Thanksgiving, 1988, the industry announced the highest
price increases in the history of airline deregulation.
Between September 1988 and February 1989, the largest
carriers announced four fare increases, and several more
since Eastern's bankruptcy in March 1989.50 Hence, the
pricing benefits many consumers enjoyed under
deregulation may be a short-term phenomenon. As the
industry becomes more highly concentrated, prices are
rising.
A recent study of nine hub airports by the Department
of Transportation found that fares at all but two increased
faster between 1985 and 1988 than the 11.1% increase in
the airline component of the Consumer Price Index:
CHART III

-

AIRLINE HUB MARKET SHARES AND PRICE

INCREASES BETWEEN 1985 AND 1988
HUB AIRPORT

DOMINANT CARRIER

Atlanta
Charlotte
Cincinnati
Detroit
Minneapolis
Pittsburgh
Raleigh
St. Louis
Salt Lake City

Delta (62%)
Piedmont (89%)
Delta (81%)
Northwest (62%)
Northwest (77%)
USAir (80%)
American (67%)
TWA (83%)
Delta (77%)

FARE INCREASES

5%
34%
25%
27%
21%
-6%
35%
22%
26%

Source: Washington Post, February 5, 1989, at H2, col. 5.

The most comprehensive study to date of the effect of
airport concentration upon pricing is that performed by
the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO compared prices at fifteen concentrated 5 ' hub airports and
thirty-eight relatively unconcentrated airports. It found
that prices were twenty-seven percent higher in the con49 Hamilton, supra note 40, at H2.
50 A Cheap Seat, supra note 25, at 68.

-I Concentrated airports were those defined as having more than 60% of enplanements handled by a single airline.
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centrated hubs.52 Prices per mile charged by dominant
airlines at concentrated hubs were thirty-eight percent
higher than those charged at unconcentrated airports.53
The Department of Transportation also conducted a
study of the impact of concentration on airline pricing
and concluded:
The average fare per mile at the eight most concentrated hubs is higher than the national average. Adjusting
for the average trip distance and the size of the market
served at the eight most concentrated hubs, fares were on
average 18.7% higher than similar markets for other airports. This finding supports the conclusion that high hub
concentration leads to high fares for passengers traveling
to and from such cities. Fares are highest for travel between large cities within 1,000 miles of the hub.54
Kenneth Mead, director of the GAO's transportation
division found that "no single factor is responsible for
higher fares at concentrated airports, but that it is the interaction of a number of barriers that allows carriers at
these airports to charge higher fares." 5 5 The GAO found
several factors correlating with higher fares:
52 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION 2, 3 (1989). The report
was subsequently updated and expanded. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE
COMPETITION 3 (1990).
The higher fares at concentrated airports do not reflect a premium for non-stop
service, since the average number of coupons per traveller at concentrated airports was virtually identical to that at unconcentrated airports (2.26 vs. 2.28 coupons). The difference persisted when average trip length was controlled by
excluding from the comparison group of airports those where average trip length
was significantly longer than for concentrated airports. Thus, neither a higher
proportion of non-stops nor a higher proportion of short-haul (and thus more
costly) flights can explain the fare premium at concentrated airports. The study
also found that the increase in fares from 1985-1988 was generally greater at concentrated airports, and that the increase in fares was especially dramatic when a
carrier established dominance during the period. Finally, the study found that in
13 of the 14 concentrated airports, the dominant carrier had higher fares, and in
some cases substantially higher fares than other carriers at the same airport. FLY-

ING BLIND, supra note 5, at 18-19.
53 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION 3 (1990).
14 U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION
IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (1990).
55 Airline Concentration, Competition Concern Senate Subcommittee, AVIATION DAILY,

Apr. 10, 1990, at 67.
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1. The larger the share of gates a carrier leased at an airport, especially on a long-term, exclusive use basis, the
higher the fares;
2. Flights at airports where a majority-in-interest clause
might reduce expansion opportunities have about 3%
higher fares;
3. Flights at airports where entry was limited by slot controls have about 7% higher air fares;
4. Airports with congested runway capacity and limited
expansion due to majority-in-interest clauses have about
3% higher fares; and
5. Carriers with a code-sharing agreement at one of the
airports on a route charge fares almost 8% higher than
carriers do on routes on which they do not code share.5 6
D.

CITY-PAIR CONCENTRATION

Many defenders of deregulation insist that the airline
industry is still hotly competitive because there are now
fewer monopoly city-pair markets.
The following chart,
at first glance, sustains this allegation:
CHART IV - NUMBER OF CITY-PAIR MARKETS RECEIVING
SINGLE-PLANE SERVICE BY ONE OR MORE SCHEDULED CARRIERS
No. OF
CARRIERS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10+

1978
4,093
899
233
80
21
14
9
6
2
2

OCT.

JULY 1988

3,481
1,054
413
192
83
45
22
14
4
6

TOTAL
5,359
5,314
Source: DOT analysis of Official Airline Guide Data, printed in Traffic World, Dec.
5, 1988, at Supp. B

56

Id.

51 Surprises of Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 319.
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It is true that the overall number of monopoly markets
has fallen since deregulation. But remember that under
regulation a monopoly cannot extract monopoly rents
from buyers because its rates are required by law to be
"just and reasonable. '5 8 Neither telephone companies
nor electric utilities can charge monopoly rates despite
their monopoly position because their rate and service
levels are regulated by governmental agencies. 59 But an
unregulated monopoly can charge whatever the market
will bear.
In 1978, single firms which dominated seventy-six percent of America's city-pair markets were limited by the
Civil Aeronautics Board to charging "just and reasonable" rates, and earning no more than a reasonable return
on investment.60 In 1988, monopoly carriers in nearly
two-thirds of America's city-pair markets could charge
whatever the market would bear. At the time the Airline
Deregulation Act was before Congress, Alfred Kahn
urged that "no automatic [pricing] freedom should be allowed in markets dominated by a single carrier."' 6 1 Today, nearly two-thirds of our nation's city-pairs are
unregulated monopolies.
Steve Morrison and Clifford Winston of the Brookings
Institution maintain that the effective number of competitors has increased from 1.5 per city-pair market before deregulation to 1.9 today.6 2 In other words, we have traded
government protection for consumers against monopoly
or oligopoly pricing for less than one half of one competitor per city-pair.
58 See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barash, 488 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1989). See also
Richard Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
741, 751 (1988).
59 See Paul L. Joslow & Richard Schmalengee, Incentive Regulation, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 2-8 (1986); Steven M. Spaeth, The Balance of Interests in Administrative Law
and Telecommunications Regulation: Have We Broken the Scales?, 43 RED. CoMM. LJ. 23,
26 (1990).
-o 14 C.F.R. § 399.31 (1978).
61 Kahn, supra note 3, at 232.
62 STEVE MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 64, 65 (1986) (study published by the Brookings Institution).
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Neither are duopolies hot beds of competition. Two
firms may implicitly agree to lethargic increases in pricing
and service competition. In 1978, ninety-three percent of
America's markets were regulated monopolies or duopolies; in 1988, eighty-five percent of America's markets
were unregulated monopolies or duopolies. 63 Statistically, this suggests an improvement. But remember that
today, no government agency protects the public against
monopoly pricing or the extraction of monopoly profits.
Before deregulation, even a high level of concentration
could be tolerated because fare levels were regulated.64 A
monopolist could not reap monopoly profits from a market because the CAB regulated rates, ensuring that they
were "just and reasonable. ' 65 But in a post deregulation
environment, these high levels of concentration are a matter of serious concern, since the regulatory mechanism
which formerly shielded consumers from price gouging
has been eradicated by deregulation.66
E.

BARRIERS TO ENTRY

For several reasons, it is unlikely that a new entrant will
emerge to rival the megacarriers. First, the infrastructure
of gates, terminal facilities, and at four of America's busiest airports (i.e., Chicago O'Hare, Washington National,
and New York's LaGuardia and Kennedy) landing slots
have been consumed. Sixty-eight percent of our airports
have no gates to lease to new entrants. 67 Even if an in63 PAUL S. DEMPSEY, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ FAIRE MYTHOLOGY

234

(1992).
64 DOT Secretary Burnley points out that the number of city-pairs served by
two carriers has increased under deregulation from 1266 to 1833. James H. Burnley, Soaring Air Travel in Unfettered Skies, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1988, at 4-D.
65 Id.
66 See Brenner, supra note 11, at 200. Even deregulation's most adamant propo-

nents are now beginning to admit this. See also Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
393 (1987); Thomas Gale Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its Effects on Passengers,
Capital, and Labor, 29J.L. & EcON. 1 (1986).
67 Robert M. Hardaway, The FAA "Buy-Sell" Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation at the
Crossroads, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 49 (1980) [hereinafter Deregulation at the
Crossroads].
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cumbent would be willing to lease a gate to an upstart airline (and at a carrier's hub, few are so willing), the
incumbent could nevertheless exact monopoly rents for
the lease. The decision of DOT to allow carriers to buy
and sell landing slots means that the deeper-pocket carriers can purchase market share, thereby enjoying market
power to reap monopoly profits. 68 Incumbent airlines
also control hub airport expansion through "majority-ininterest" clauses. 69 Moreover, restrictions on the type of
equipment that carriers can use at several noise restricted
airports also constrains new entry.
Second, the largest airlines today own the largest computer reservations systems (CRS), from which ninety percent of tickets are sold.7 ° Many critics argue that such
vertical integration offers the incumbents the potential to
enjoy various forms of system bias (including screen, connecting point, and database bias). 7 1 The GAO has also
found that the airline-owned systems are so dominant that
they stifle competition in the industry.72 An airline which
owns a CRS has a thirteen to eighteen percent greater
likelihood of selling its tickets through the system.73
68 Id.

69 Often an airport will expand its capacity in order to accommodate a carrier

that decides to set up a hub there. The carrier and the airport will typically enter
into a long-term lease agreement for space at the facility. The revenues from the
lease payments will be used to underwrite the airport bonds sold to pay for the
capacity expansion and thereby lower the costs of borrowing. As a quid pro quo,
the airline may require the airport to include a majority-in-interest clause in the
lease agreement giving the airline substantial influence in any future airport construction activities that would affect its lease payments.
OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION 26 (1990).

GENERAL ACCOUNTING

70 United sold half of its Apollo/Covia system for $500 million in 1988 to USAir
and five foreign airlines. In 1989, American sold half of its Sabre system to Delta
Airlines for $650 million. Bridget O'Brian, Delta, AMR's American Airlines Plan to
Merge Computer Reservations Systems, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1989, at B10. TWA had
previously sold half of its CRS to Northwest Orient, and Eastern's system had
been transferred to a Texas Air subsidiary for a paltry $100 million. Janice Castro, Eastern Goes Bust, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 52.
11 See Derek Saunders, The Antitrust Implicationsof Computer Reservations Systems, 51
J. AIR L. & CoM. 157 (1985).
72 Tom Hamburger, FightingBack Begins As Costs Go Up, Up and Away, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 24, 1988, at 6A.
7. Id. (quoting Michael Levine).
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United and American own the dominant computer reservations systems, which together account for seventy-seven
percent of passenger bookings.
Moreover, the advantages of being listed in the computer as an "on line" connection with one of the major
airlines has led forty-eight of the fifty small air carriers to
affiliate themselves with the megacarriers, renaming their
companies (for example, United Express, Continental Express, or American Eagle) and repainting their aircraft in
megacarrier colors. Ninety percent of the 31.7 million
passengers who flew aboard regional airlines in 1987 were
carried aboard code-sharing airlines. 74 The small carriers
have become, in effect, franchisees of the behemoths of
the industry, and are therefore an unlikely source from
which new competition will spring. They are also declining in number. The regional airlines, peaking at 246 in
1981, dwindled to 168 by 1987. 7 5 Sophisticated computers also give airlines the ability to manage yield in a
way to adjust the number of seats for which discounts are
offered on an hourly basis, depending on passenger demand for seats.76
Third, large airlines have more attractive frequent flyer
programs, which serve as a lure to business travelers, the
most lucrative segment of the market. Once committed to
a carrier's frequent flyer program and having some investment in accumulated mileage, a business traveler may
prefer that carrier over its rivals even when the rivals'
flights are cheaper. After all, most business travel is not
paid by the individual flying, but by the firm.
Brand loyalty makes it difficult for a new rival to find a
niche, particularly when its frequent flyer program offers
free travel to decidedly less exotic destinations. Suppose
a major airport could be found with sufficient capacity to
allow a new rival to establish a hub. How could, for exam74 Dereg's Falling Stars, OAG FREQUENT FLYER, Aug. 1988, at 28.
75 Id.
76 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF COMPUTERIZED RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS 6 (1986).
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pie, an Air Omaha lure passengers away from its rivals'
frequent flyer programs with their free trips to Hawaii,
when Air Omaha could only offer a free weekend in Cedar
Rapids?
Not only are the frequent flyer programs creating passenger loyalty, but commission overrides and promotions
are generating travel agent loyalty. 77 Hence, both the
passenger and agent often prefer a more expensive, established airline, to a discount carrier. Indeed, the travel
agent has been given an incentive to engage in fraud.
Suppose a consumer calls and asks whether there is a
flight on Carrier A at noon. There is, but the agent is
working toward commission overrides on Carrier B this
month. It would be easy for the agent to say, "Sorry, the
noon flight is sold out. But I can get you a seat at 1:30 on
Carrier B."
Fourth, although new entrants enjoyed significantly
lower labor costs in the inaugural years of deregulation,
the squeeze on carrier profits unleashed by deregulation
has forced management to exact serious concessions in
terms of labor wages and work rules. Some, like Continental and TWA, have effectively crushed their unions.
Others like United, American, and Delta, established twotier pay scales, with B grade pay for newly hired employees. Thus, the margin of labor cost and productivity between a new entrant and an established airline has been
narrowed.
Fifth, incumbents have shown that they will not sit idly
by while new rivals rob them of market share. When the
new entrants offer lower fares, the incumbents almost always match them. This destroys the new rival for a
number of reasons. For example, suppose our new carrier, Air Omaha, does some calculations and finds that if it
offers a forty-nine dollar fare between Omaha and Minne11Domestic commission overrides range from 1% to 5% above the standard
9% to 10% commission. International bonuses can be several times the standard
8% commission. Robert A. Rose, Travel Agents' Games Raise Ethics Issue, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 23, 1988, at BI.
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apolis, it will fill about seventy percent of its seats because
the incumbent, Northwest, offers no fare so low. 7 8 Because of lower labor costs and the use of leased, relatively
old equipment, assume Air Omaha's break even load factor is a modest 55%.7 So, Air Omaha begins operations
and rolls in a healthy profit, right? Wrong. Northwest
matches the forty-nine dollar fare, and Air Omaha's load
factors drop to, say thirty-five percent, well below its
break even load factor. The antitrust laws have little to
say about following a price leader. Not only can Northwest withstand the loss because of its deeper pocket, but
the discount fare actually costs it little, because it is only
offered to passengers traveling between two points (origin
and destination traffic). Remember, Northwest has a major hub in Minneapolis, and most of its passengers are
traveling to beyond points; they are not offered the bargain fare. Thus, only a portion of its passengers are enjoying the discount. Moreover, many of the business
travelers in the city-pair market will be willing to pay more
than forty-nine dollars because they are addicted to
Northwest's frequent flyer program. Air Omaha must
eventually exit the market, for only a carrier with a hub at
the other end point can successfully challenge a rival at its
hub.
Finally, with more than 150 airlines having failed since
1978, many having been pushed into the abyss of bankruptcy by the predatory behavior of their larger rivals, investor confidence in new airline ventures has largely
evaporated. 0
Hence, significant new entry is highly unlikely in the
deregulated airline industry. 8 ' The dominance by incumbent carriers of gates, terminal space, landing and takeoff
78 Between 1984 and 1988, the industry average domestic load factor ranged
between 59% and 62%. AMR CORP. ANN. REP. 9 (1989).
79 In contrast, United's break even load factor between 1986 and 1988 ranged
between 62% and 64%. UAL CORP. ANN. REP. 1 (1988).
80 See George Russell, Flying Among the Merger Clouds, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at
56-57.
SI See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 593-94.
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slots, computer reservations systems, and the most attractive frequent flyer programs makes it unlikely that new entrants will emerge to challenge the megacarriers. In fact,
no major carrier has emerged since 1985.82
The theory of contestable markets, which provided an
intellectual justification for deregulation, has been refuted
by an overwhelming body of empirical evidence.83 The
theory was premised upon the false assumption that transportation was inherently competitive, and that the only
barriers to entry were governmental requirements that
carriers obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity before being allowed to compete. Here again, deregulation's proponents overestimated the competitive
nature of the industry. As Alfred Kahn noted, "certainly
one of the assumptions behind airline deregulation was
that entry would be relatively easy." ' 84 Former DOT As82

Hamburger, supra note 3, at 9A.

83 As one commentator noted:

[E]ntry into the industry by new carriers seems remote, and entry
onto new routes is far more difficult than many envisioned it would
be with deregulation. Many airline observers thought that the 1978
deregulation of pricing and entry would make airline markets 'contestable.' That is, airlines could engage in hit-and-run entry into
each other's markets in response to profit opportunities - simply by
shifting a plane from one route to another. Instead the evidence
compiled in the USAir-Piedmont record, as well as a large body of
solid research by economic and legal scholars in the past three years,
demonstrates that incumbent airlines are frequently able to charge
higher prices on routes where other carriers face barriers to entry.
Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, Hubs Can Hurt on Shorter Flights at Crowded Airports,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1987, at 34.
84 Kahn Interview, supra note 6, at 6. In response to the question of whether
there was "too much emphasis given to the absence of entry barriers and to the
theoretical possibility of entry, as opposed to actual entry," Kahn recently recounted his support for pricing regulation in markets having but one or two carriers, as 85% of America's city-pairs today do:
Unquestionably. Certainly one of the assumptions behind airline
deregulation was that entry would be relatively easy .... The origi-

nal deregulation bill retained a rate regulatory ceiling on any routes
in which a single carrier accounted for 90 percent or more of business. As Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, I testified on behalf of a unanimous board which had adopted the posture of
favoring deregulation, that the ceiling trigger should be changed to
70 percent. We believed that while entry should be legally free and
would be relatively easy, we never thought that would provide ade-

1992]

AIRLINES, AIRPORTS AND ANTITRUST

485

sistant Secretary Matthew Scocozza recently confessed,
"To be very honest, in 1978 we envisioned that there
would be a hundred airlines flying to every major hub
"85

The foundation upon which the theory rested has been
shattered by a decade of evidence that proves that economic barriers to entry, significant advantages in terms of
traffic density, and economies of scale and scope do exist
in the airline industry, and are of some significance. As
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles Rule,
recently observed, "Most airline markets do not appear to
be contestable, if they ever were ....Difficulties of entry,
particularly on city pairs involving hub cities, mean that
hit-and-run entry is a theory that does not comport with
current reality." ' 6
Even if new entry is unlikely, why should we be concerned with the high level of concentration which has
emerged in the airline industry under deregulation? After
quate protection in markets that are naturally monopolistic or oligopolistic-that just won't support more than one or two carriers. But
what happened was that the ideologues began simplistically to parrot the word contestability as though it were a substitute for looking
at the realities, even if the realities were manifestly changing, even if
survival of the new entrants was becoming more and more questionable, as more and more of them were going out of business, and
even as it became clear that domination of hubs was increasingly unchallengeable by new entrants.
Id. at 6-7. Recently, Kahn admitted, "There is no question that increased concentration is associated with increased fares." See Hamburger, supra note 71, at 6A.
Kahn has acknowledged that the time has come to consider price ceilings in markets dominated by a single carrier. Ex-Official Suggests Lid on Air Fares, RocKy MTN
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1987, at 100. Said Kahn, "I don't reject the idea as a matter of
principle. If price gouging gets bad enough, consumers will demand and deserve
protection." Hamburger, supra note 71, at 6A. See also Safety and Regulation, supra
note 3, at 159-60. He said, "[T]he imperfections of competition I have identified
suggest the possible desirability of maximum fares on inadequately competitive
routes (which I advocated at the time not be abandoned) .... Kahn, supra note
3, at 239.
85 Power, supra note 12, at 73.
86 Charles Rule, Antitrust and Airline Mergers: A New Era, in 57 TP.ANSP. PRAC. J.,
Mar. 7, 1989, 62, at 68, 70. On January 1, 1989, the Justice Department took over
the largely latent airline merger authority of DOT. Id. Mr. Rule's recognition of
market reality appears to be a breath of fresh air over his DOT's counterpart's
blind faith in market theory.

486

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

all, even though Coke and Pepsi dominate the soft drink
industry, don't we still have pricing competition between
them? Although other American industries are dominated by huge firms, transportation is different because of
the way it impacts the economy. Melvin Brenner said it
best:
Other industries, even when comprised of only a few large
firms, do not usually end up with a one-supplier monopoly
in specific local markets. But this can happen in air
transportation.
Moreover, because of the nature of transportation, a local monopoly can do greater harm to a community than
could a local monopoly in some other industry. This is
because transportation is a basic part of the economic/social/cultural infrastructure, which affects the efficiency of
all other business activities in a community and the quality
of life of its residents. The ability of a city to retain existing industries, and attract new ones, is uniquely dependent upon the adequacy, convenience, and reasonable
pricing of its airline service.8 7
III.

EXISITING ANTITRUST LAW

A. HISTORY
The tremendous rise in industrial activity after the Civil
War gave rise to a concentration of the means of production in the United States. This development in turn led to
the creation of cartels and agreements to fix prices at
levels above competitive levels. These and other abusive
practices led Congress in 1890 to pass the Sherman Antitrust Act, which forbade unlawful attempts to monopolize,
as well as conspiracies in the restraint of trade.88 The
original language of this seminal piece of antitrust legislation remains substantially unchanged:
§ 1 Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or comBrenner, supra note 11, at 189.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
87
88
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merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal... 89
§ 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States . . . shall be . . . guilty of a

felony. 90

Early Supreme Court cases interpreting the Act were
narrow, holding that the word "commerce" in the Act
limited application of its provisions to the actual trading
of commodities and not to the manufacture of commodities. 9 ' It was only after the trustbearing policies of the
Theodore Roosevelt administration ignited broader interpretations of the Act that Congress created the Federal
Trade Commission and passed the Clayton Act.92 This
Act expanded upon the Sherman Act by prohibiting price
discrimination and restricting such practices as tying contracts, exclusive dealing arrangements, and the use of interlocking directors.93 However, inasmuch as the Clayton
Act also broadly expanded application of the antitrust
laws, subsequent antitrust legislation and case law was directed primarily to providing exemptions to such entities
as sports leagues, labor unions, and government subdivisions. 9 4 Although the Robinson-Patman Act and KellerKefanner Act subsequently filled "jurisdictional holes,"
the Sherman Act remains the cornerstone of antitrust law
in the United States.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp. 1992).
- Id. § 2.
91 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895); overruled by, Madeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230 (1948).
92 See W. Hamilton & I. Till, Antitrust in Action (Monograph at 16, National Economic Committee), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1940) (cited in ERNEST GELLHORN,
ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONOMIcs 27 (1986)).
93 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (1973).
- For a statute regarding sports leagues, see Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932, 18
U.S.C.A. § 3692 (1973). See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). For case law
regarding labor unions, see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
For case law regarding government subdivisions, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
89
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THE LAWFUL MONOPOLY

At first blush it would appear that the existing state of
monopolization of airport resources by one or two dominant carriers is in direct violation of section two of the
Sherman Act that forbids monopolization of "any part of
... commerce among the several States." ' 95 In this regard,
section two of the Act applies to any entity "who shall monopolize," or "attempt to monopolize" and, unlike section 1 is not limited to a "contract... combination ... or
conspiracy."' 96 There are, however, several legal obstacles
to overcome before the Sherman Act can be directly applied to either airline or airport monopolization of airport
resources.
First, the airport itself may be immune from antitrust
action under the State Action Doctrine first set forth by
the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.97 However, subsequent cases have attempted to set out exceptions to this
doctrine.98 Second, if the focus is to be on the airline itself, it must be shown either that an airline "conspired" to
95 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1992).
96 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp. 1992).
91 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52. Here, state "participation" in the form of agricultural production provisions was held not to be in violation of the Commerce
Clause. Further, "the state command to the Commission and to the program
committee of the California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by the Sherman
Act since, in view of the latter's words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state action." Id. at 352. There is no suggestion of a
purpose to restrain "State Action" in the Act's legislative history.
The state, in adopting and enforcing the prorate program, made no contract or
agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish
monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which
the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332,
344-45 (1904); but cf Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 910 (1895). However, a
state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it or by declaring that their action is lawful. Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332 (1904).
98 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., I I I S. Ct. 1344
(1991). Prior to this decision, various circuit courts held that exceptions existed
to this state immunity doctrine. See Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1344
(1991); Witworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992, aff'd on
reh', 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979), overruled by
Omni, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
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restrain trade (in violation of section one of the Sherman
Act), or that an airline "monopolized" a market (in violation of section two). Moreover, the airline itself might
also be protected under the airport's immunity umbrella
pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 99
Since monopolization of airport resources can be traced
to long-term lease agreements entered into between airlines and airports, but not to specific agreements between
individual airlines, a successful section one strategy appears unlikely. This leaves a section two strategy based
on the empirical evidence and undeniable fact that airport
resources are monopolized at the nation's most important
airports by one or two dominant carriers. 00 That such
monopoly power has been used to raise fares above competitive rates is also clear from the empirical evidence.' ° '
However, even this evidence may not be enough, since
'monopolization" has been interpreted by the courts to
require not only monopoly power, but a finding that a
firm "willfully acquired or maintained that power."' 0°
Lest such a formulation appear as a semantical convolution, one scholar has attempted to clarify the rule and define a lawful monopoly as follows:
Proof of the existence of monopoly power does not prove
the offense of monopolization .... [I]f the firm does not

engage in market conduct which has the purpose or effect
of protecting, enhancing, or extending its power - then the
firm, despite its monopoly power, is not in violation of
Section 2; it is a lawful monopoly. A party charging the offense of monopolization must prove both the existence of
monopoly power and either that the power was acquired
or has been used in ways which go beyond normal, hon99See generally United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
,oSee supra Part II and text accompanying notes 38-56.
10,United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
102 In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System, 720 F. Supp.
1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys.
Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
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estly industrial business conduct.'l°
C.

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

Most antitrust actions brought by airlines or operators
against airports owned by municipal corporations and authorities have been defeated by application of the State
Action Doctrine. First enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 10 4 this doctrine states
that "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act... suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state.., from activ10 5
ities directed by its legislature."'
10 6
In Pueblo Aircraft Service Inc. v. City of Pueblo, Colorado,
fixed based airport operators brought an antitrust action
against the City of Pueblo, Colorado as owners of the local municipal airport. 10 7 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a finding of municipal immunity from
antitrust action.'0 " In doing so, it relied on the U.S.
Supreme Court case of Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, Colorado,'09 which held that municipal action need not itself constitute state action in order to
qualify for immunity, but need only constitute "municipal
action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articu10 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 32, at 94
(1977) (emphasis added and citations omitted) (cited by Apollo, 720 F. Supp. 1068,
1977 (1989)).
1- 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

105Id. at 350-51. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93
(1940); Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-58 (1910); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1899).
IN 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983).
107
A fixed base operation is one that requires the operator who
enters into a lease agreement-contract with City to provide specific
facilities, services, equipment and personnel to meet the requirements for certain operations of an airport used by aircraft, passengers, crews and freight shippers. In most cases, the leases include
those portions of the airport premises with hangars and other improvements thereon where the services and supplies are performed
and kept.
Id. at 806 n.3.
1o Id. at 809.
0-

455 U.S. 40 (1982).

1992]

AIRLINES, AIRPORTS AND ANTITRUST

491

lated and affirmatively expressed state policy.""t 0
In Pueblo, the court found that allegedly anti-competitive airport actions under a municipal ordinance enacted
pursuant to a home rule provision of the Colorado constitution did not constitute "municipal action" qualifying for
Parker immunity.'
It nevertheless granted immunity to
the Pueblo airport based on the statutory grant to the city
by the state "to acquire and operate a municipal airport. '" 2 This statute further declared that such airport
operations were "public governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public
necessity."' 13
Similar considerations led to a conferral of antitrust immunity on the Massachusetts Port Authority in 1966, and

again in 1987, when airlines brought antitrust actions
based on the Port Authority's denial of access to airport
resources. 1 4 Although the First Circuit acknowledged in
the 1987 case that the Supreme Court had "tightened the
immunity rules for certain kinds of state instrumentalities,"'' 5 it nevertheless granted antitrust immunity to the
Port Authority based on such "typical governmental attributes as the power of eminent domain, rulemaking au-6
'
thority, bonding authority, and tax exempt status." "1
Thus, the court found that the immunity requirement of a
110Id. at 52 (cited in Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 808). See Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), supersededby statute,
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, § 3(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 35(a); Opdyke
Inv. Co. v. City of Detroit, 883 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1989). See generally California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980);
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).
11 Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 807.
112

Id. at 808 (relying on COLO.

REV. STAT. § 41-4-101

(1973)).

113Id.

"14 Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 912 (1st Cir.
1987); E. W. Wiggins Airways Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
11

Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 13.

116 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91 app., §§ 1-3, 1-4, 1-8, 1-9, 1-17

(West 1992)); but cf Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286, 1290 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (citing these attributes as a rationale for finding that the Authority was similar to a municipality).
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finding of municipal action pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" 1 7 was
satisfied.
Likewise in Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. Pitkin
County," 8 the court granted antitrust immunity to a county
considered to be a political subdivision of the state." 9 In
Rocky Mountain, an airline alleged that the airport had
used its monopoly power to charge fees and rents that
were far above competitive levels. Relying on Pueblo and
Community Communications, the court found that the county,
by operating the airport, was "undeniably acting in its
governmental (rather than proprietary) capacity and, like
the City of Pueblo [was] immune from the . . . Federal
Antitrust laws."' 20 The court relied on the fact that Pueblo
conceded and that the state "by affirmative legislative action granted [municipalities] an
exemption from opera12
tion of federal antitrust laws."' '
Although most other reported cases of antitrust lawsuits against municipal or county airports have failed due
to application of the State Action Doctrine, there are a few
cases in which the courts have refused to grant immunity.
In Pumpkin Air, Inc. v. City of Addison, 12 2 for example, the
district court refused to grant immunity to a city in an antitrust action brought by aviation-related entities who al23
leged that they were denied access to airport resources.
Despite language in a Texas statute stating that "every
municipality is authorized ... to plan ... operate, [and]
regulate . . . airports,"'124 the court nevertheless concluded that the legislation did not contemplate the implementation of anti-competitive activities in airport
17 Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 13 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
118674 F. Supp. 312 (D. Colo. 1987).

119Id. at 316.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 809).
122 608 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
123

Id. at 795.

124 TEX.

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-2 (West 1992).
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operation. "While it is conceivable that (the legislation)
was not intended to encompass the antitrust laws, its plain
meaning cannot be ignored."'' 25 Further, the court distinguished the Colorado statute that had been held to confer
immunity in Pueblo by noting that "[a]lthough the Colorado provisions are similar in their authorizations to the
Texas Act, the former is not comparable to the (Texas
legislation), subordinating the law's provisions to the
' 26
mandates of federal law."'
D.

THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE

Private firm defendants argue, like their municipal partners, that they too were clothed with antitrust immunity
under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine set forth in two
Supreme Court cases.' 27 Under this doctrine a private
firm enjoys immunity where its monopoly is the result of
the firm's exercise of its First Amendment rights in lawfully petitioning or lobbying the city for concessions or
privileges. In 1988, the Supreme Court reiterated that
"[p]rivate action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring
favorable government action is a mere sham that cannot
be deemed a valid effort to influence government action."' 28 This is categorized as the "sham" exception,
and is noted by a circuit court: "Actions taken to discourage and ultimately prevent competitors from meaningful
access to the processes of administrative agencies fall
within the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity."'' 29 In Noerr, the Court conceded: "[T]here may be
situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed towards influencing governmental action, is a mere
125 Pumpkin Air, 608 F. Supp. at 791 (citing Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
126 Id. at 792.
127 United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 144-45
(1961).
128 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4
(1988).
129 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 904 (1983).
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sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act
would be justified."

3 0

Furthermore, City of Columbia v. Omni OutdoorAdvertising,
Inc. 131 provided that the "sham exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental
process - as opposed to the outcome of that process as an anticompetitive weapon."' 132 An example of such a
weapon is the filing of frivolous objections to the license
application of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose
expense and delay. 3 3 Further, a "sham" situation involves a defendant whose activities are ingenuously
aimed
134
action.
government
favorable
at obtaining
E.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST ACT OF

1984

Although a municipality and the associated private de13oNoerr, 365 U.S. at 144.

111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
1354. Note, however, that the Court rejected an alternate exception to
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: the "co-conspirator" exception. This was the
most significant indication of a crack in the dike of state immunity that now holds
back antitrust actions against airports for monopolization of resources. In Omni,
the plaintiff, a private billboard firm, brought an antitrust action against the city of
Columbia, South Carolina, and another private firm for allegedly conspiring to
keep the plaintiff out of the city's outdoor advertising market. The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that, in order to enjoy antitrust immunity, a city need not show that
its acts were under legislative compulsion, that the state actively supervised the
city's activities, or even that the state expressly authorized the city to engage in
anti-competitive conduct, so long as anti-competitive aspects are a foreseeable result of the authorized actions. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1131. Rather, all that is required
of a city is that it is adhering to state policy to replace competition with regulation.
Id.
Despite finding that this latter requirement was met, however, the court refused
to clothe the city with immunity where the jury had found that the city "conspired
solely to further a private firm's commercial purposes to the "detriment of competition." Id. Citing dictum from Parker, the court adopted the "conspiracy" exception: "We have no question [in this case] of the municipality becoming a
participant in a private agreement or combination with others for restraint of
trade." Id. at 1133 (quoting Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52).
133 Omni, 111 S.Ct. at 1354. See also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1972).
'-4 Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1357.
'3,

132 Id. at
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fendant may not be immune from antitrust liability, the
city might nevertheless be immune from damages under
the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.' 5 This Act,
passed by Congress in response to the outcry of local governments fearful of the financial ruin of antitrust treble
damage liability, prohibits damages, interest, costs and attorneys' fees in antitrust actions brought against local
governments. 3 6 Although the statute does not purport to
limit injunctive relief, it was clearly expected to limit the
number of antitrust actions against local governments. A
commentary to the Act states:
Note that the Act does not change the legal tests for showing that a local government has violated the antitrust laws.
It is limited to changing the remedies available to a private
plaintiff who does prove a violation. Nevertheless, the removal of the incentive of treble damage liability may be
expected to curb the prior explosive growth in treble damage actions against local governmental units but not necessarily eliminate them.'3 7
Thus, even if a court refuses to confer immunity on a
municipality where there is evidence that the municipality
was not acting pursuant to a state statutory scheme or direction but rather conspiring to further a private entity's
commercial purposes, the Local Government Antitrust
Act makes action against a municipality an unpromising
strategy for breaking up an airport monopoly.
F.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ANTITRUST LIABILITY

Even if the defense of immunity can be overcome, there
remains the question of the legal basis for an antitrust attack on airport monopolization. It is concluded that the
empirical evidence does not provide a strong factual basis
for a finding of section one antitrust liability.
The existing state of monopolization of airport re135 15 U.S.C.
536
137

§§ 34-36 (West Supp. 1992).

Id. § 36.
ROBERT

(1991).

M.

HARDAWAY, AIRPORT DEREGULATION LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

227
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sources can be traced to two distinct developments. Incumbent airlines originally obtained their rights of access
to airport resources through long-term lease agreements
with airport authorities. Such agreements have long been
an essential feature of airport financing, since guarantees
of airline use of airport facilities are considered a prerequisite to investor support and the sale of municipal
bonds. 138 "Majority-in-interest" clauses in such leases
often assure a participating airline of a significant role in
important decisions regarding the development of the
39
airport. 1
Since many of these leases extended for periods as long
as thirty years or more, 40 effective airline control of airport resources was also extended for such periods. Such
control made entry by new firms extremely difficult. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, many major airports had no gates
4
or terminal space available for new entrants.' '
When the FAA in 1969 designated five major airports
as "high density" airports, the number of take-offs and
landings were limited by means of the FAA's High Density
Rule (HDR). 142 Later, in 1985 incumbent airlines were
grandfathered to most existing "slots," further consolidating the grip of incumbent airlines on airport resources. 143 Although the 1985 FAA "Buy-Sell" Slot Rule
permitted the sale of slots by incumbents to new firms,
and a few slots were distributed by lottery, competitive
pressures were such that, in practice, few slots changed
hands, and those which did often were sold at exorbitant
prices. 144
The second development was a multitude of airline
mergers, the most significant of which occurred during
138Id. at 93-104.
140

Deregulation at the Crossroads, supra note 66, 19-20 (1980).
Id. at 45-46.

141

HARDAWAY, supra note 137, at 187-88.

'39

142 Deregulation at

the Crossroads,supra note 66, at 3.
at 4.
Id. at 27-28; HARDAWAY, supra note 137, at 193.

143 Id.
144
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the period 1984 to 1988. ' 45 The result of such mergers
was to consolidate control of the aviation industry in the
hands of a few dominant carriers. Many firms were
purchased not for their tangible assets (in many cases they
had no tangible net worth) but rather for their rights of
access to airport resources in the form of slots and lease
rights to gates and terminal space. By 1988 this process
of consolidation was already in its final phase, and access
to the majority of major airports was controlled by one or
two dominant carriers.
G.

ANTITRUST THEORIES

In seeking the most appropriate antitrust strategy for
breaking up the airport monopolies, several theories and
doctrines have been considered and rejected. Traditional
antitrust theories based on monopolization under Section
2 have been rejected as lacking sufficient evidence of willful acquisition of monopoly power.' 46 For example,
under an "exclusive dealing" theory, it might be argued
that an airline's lease agreement with an airport discourages an airport from leasing additional space to competitors.1 4 7 Evidentiary support for this thesis might be found

in the language of majority-in-interest and other clauses
in lease agreements that give an airline veto power or
other effective control over whether an airport may expand or further develop its facilities. Such expansion
would, of course, make space available to the incumbent
airlines' potential competitors. An antitrust policy against
such exclusive dealing can be found in the case of Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States 148 in which the Court
declared agreements between Standard Oil Company and
independent gas stations, whereby the independent sta,45 The market and deregulatory dynamics that motivated such mergers are discussed in Part II.
146 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
147 See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (3d
ed. 1980).
,48 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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tions agreed not to sell other than Standard's brand, illegal.' 49 Even if an analogy could be found between selling
gasoline and selling (or leasing) terminal gates, however,
the focus of any antitrust action would be on the airport
(which is likely immune), not the airline.' 50 Furthermore,
airport lease agreements generally do not in fact contain
specific exclusionary clauses' 5 ' and "legitimate business
reasons" can be found for the majority-in-interest clauses.
A "tie-in" theory, based on InternationalSalt Co. v. United
States,' 52 might be based on the argument that an airline's
agreement to use an airport's facilities "tied-in" to an
agreement to purchase only fuel sold by the airport at
above market prices. Such a theory, although useful in an
antitrust action by an incumbent airline against an airport
(assuming no immunity), would not provide a basis for
breaking up the monopolization of airport resources.
Likewise, a "boycott" or "joint venture" theory might
be based on the premise that incumbent airlines, by contracts or combinations, have agreed that an airport will
not sell airport access rights to competitors. 5 3 However,
this theory lacks sufficient evidentiary foundation. While
there is some anecdotal evidence of airline scheduling
committees refusing to allocate slots to new entrants or
competitors even when those slots were available, such
evidence is derived primarily from the pre-1979 regulatory period when the committees enjoyed antitrust
protection.
H.

THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIEs DOCTRINE

The Essential Facilities Doctrine is the most appropri149 Id. at

311.

150See Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1987).
151Contra Everett v. City of Wynne, 730 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1987).
1-2 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (lease of patented salt injection machine tied to lessee's

obligation to use only lessor's salt products therein).
153See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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ate theoretical basis for antitrust action. We recognize
that there is presently considerable debate both as to this
doctrine's place in the law of antitrust and its economic
underpinnings. 54 Indeed, if there is any consensus at all
regarding the doctrine, it is that the standards that have
emerged are by no means clear and consistent. 55 This
has been explained by the observation that "[n]o single
1 56
case is comprehensive in its treatment of the issue,"
that the case claimed to be the source of the doctrine, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,' 57 is not an essential faciliwith
ties case at all, and that the doctrine is often confused
58
foreclosure.
vertical
of
doctrine
related
the
The most cited example of the application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine is the 1912 Supreme Court case of
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis.' 5 9
In Terminal Railroad, an association of railroads acquired
control over the critical bridge spanning the Mississippi
River in St. Louis. Competing railroads were either excluded from access to the bridge (which provided the only
economical rail link to the west), or given access only on
discriminatory terms. The Court held that the railroad
had to share its exclusive lines with competing railroads.' 60 The doctrine based on this result was later summarized by a federal court as follows: "Any company
which controls an 'essential facility' or a 'strategic bottleneck' . . . violates the antitrust laws if it fails to make ac'4 See, e.g., William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A ComparativeIndustry Approach to
the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337 (1987). See generally Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Stephen C. Salop, Analyzing Anti-competitive Exclusion, Appendix A,
56 ANTITRUST L.J. 71, 82-84 (1987) ("Exclusionary behavior remains one of the
most controversial areas of antitrust and economics.").
155 David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A Legal and
Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential Facilities", 74 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1988)
(arguing that application of the doctrine may inhibit economic efficiency).
156 Tye, supra note 154, at 344.
157

410 U.S. 366 (1973).

supra note 154, at 344-45 (citing Floyd L. Norton & Michael B. Early,
Limitations on the Obligation to Provide Access to Electric Transmission and Distribution
Lines, 5 ENERGY L.J. 47, 54-55 (1984)).
159 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).
- Id. at 409-13.
158 Tye,
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cess to that facility available to its competitors on fair and
reasonable terms that do not disadvantage them." 161
The essential facilities doctrine has since been applied
to declare illegal the refusal of a sports arena to lease its
premises to a competitor. 6 2 In another classic application of the doctrine, the Federal Communications Commission prohibited American Telephone and Telegraph
63
from refusing competitors access to its telephone lines.'
However, the courts have refused to apply the doctrine in
other cases, such as where the owner of a minidome refused to lease to competitors.' 64
The Supreme Court addressed the corollary question of
refusal to deal with competitors in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp. 165 This case involved a dispute between Aspen Skiing, operator of three of the four ski facilities in Aspen, Colorado, and Aspen Highlands, operator
of the fourth. Aspen Skiing would only agree to offer a
multi-area ticket used at all four of the Aspen ski facilties
if Aspen Highlands would accept an unreasonably low
fixed percentage of the revenue. Aspen Highlands refused and suffered a sharp decline in its revenues.
The jury found the three operators liable for monopolization under section two of the Sherman Act, and characterized the defendants actions in excluding the plaintiff as
a refusal to deal.' 66 Defendants argued on appeal to the
Tenth Circuit that no such duty exists unless the defendant, through vertical integration, has come to monopolize
the "supply of a component necessary for production, distribution or sale of a rival's product or service."'' 67 The
'61 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352 (D.D.C.
1981).
162 Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
'63 American Tel., 524 F. Supp. 1336.
I- Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 848 F.2d 976,
983-94 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376-78 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
165 472 U.S. 585, 604-05 (1985).

I- Id. at 597.
167 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1518
(10th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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Tenth Circuit, however, declined to "adopt a narrow rule
that would immunize an unintegrated monopolist from
antitrust liability,"'168 and instead asserted that " 'in a case
where there is a unilateral refusal-to-deal by 69
a monopolist'
'
... the bottleneck doctrine is applicable."'
Noting that the duty to deal constitutes one of the most
'unsettled and vexatious' issues in antitrust law," the
70
Tenth Circuit preceded to recognize two lines of cases.'
The first line deals specifically with the essential facilities
doctrine under which "a business or group of businesses
which controls a scarce facility has an obligation to give
competitors reasonable access to it.' 'I7 The second line
of cases employs an intent test whereby a business may
deal with whomever it chooses as long as no "purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly" exists.' 72 The second
line of cases focuses on the actual intent manifested by the
refusal to deal, rather than whether the facility in question
is in fact essential.17 3 Instead of choosing between the
two lines, the circuit court in Aspen applied both lines, to
support the finding of antitrust liability against the defendants. 74 The Tenth Circuit stated the proposition
that four elements (the MCI requirements) are necessary
to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine:
1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 2) a
competitor's inability to duplicate the facility; 3) denial of
the use of the facility to competitor, and 4) the feasibility
of providing the facility."'' 75 To establish liability under
1-s
Id. at 1519.
169 Id. (quoting Byers v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 860 (7th Cir. 1979)).
170 Id. (quoting Byers, 609 F.2d at 846).
171 Id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (enjoining
Associated Press from refusing to furnish its service to its Members competitors));
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (prohibiting fruit wholesalers who jointly own a
warehouse from excluding a competing wholesaler absent some justification).
17 Aspen Skiing, 738 F.2d at 1519 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
173 Id.
174Id. at 1520.
17- Id. (citing MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708
F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
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the second test a showing of intent to "create or maintain
76
a monopoly must be established."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's judgment on the grounds of monopolization, and therefore
did not reach the issue of the applicability of the essential
facilities doctrine. 17 7 However, the Supreme Court cautioned that there was no general "duty to deal," and affirmed that any section two violation of the Sherman Act
78
required both the power and the intent to monopolize.
Intent, however, could be shown by the failure to prove a
79
valid business excuse.
Despite the less than enthusiastic references to the essential facilities doctrine by the Supreme Court in Aspen,
its affirmance of the judgment recognizes limits to liability
for refusal to deal with a competitor. Some scholars suggest that the Supreme Court's test for monopolistic intent
is so broad that "it could find liability in nearly all refusals
that generate anti-competitive effects."''8 0 Robert Bork
suggests that, absent any anti-competitive incentives to
refuse to deal, there should be an assumption that economic efficiency provides the motive for a refusal to
deal. 18 David Gerber suggests that application of the essential facilities doctrine involves a "type of price regulation for monopolists who are fortuitously situated in
natural monopoly industries and who may be required to
share the wealth. Courts should be cautious in imposing a
duty to deal in such cases so that they do not indiscriminately penalize successful and lawful competitors. "182
Nor have the circuit courts been willing to give broad
interpretation to Aspen. In Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v.
176Id. at

1521 (quoting United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).

17 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.

Id. at 600-01, 603 n.28.
597.
180Gerber, supra note 155, at 1081.
181 Id. at 1085 (citing ROBERT BORK,
WAR WITH ITSELF 290 (1978)).
182 Id. at 1113.
178

179Id. at
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Western Union Telegraph Co. ,183 Judge Posner observed that
Aspen is narrowly written: "If it stands for any principle
that goes beyond its unusual facts, it is that a monopolist
may be guilty of monopolization if it refuses to cooperate
with a competitor in circumstances where some8 4cooperation is indispensable to effective competition."'
In light of such criticism, both judicial and scholarly,
the question remains whether the essential facilities doctrine can be a useful vehicle for the breaking up of the
airport monopolies. For the reasons stated in the following section, we submit that the essential facilities doctrine,
even encumbered with the Posner proviso, is the most potent weapon available for attacking today's airport monopolies. It requires, however, adaptation to the unique
circumstances surrounding today's modern airport.
IV.

TOWARD AN ANTITRUST STRATEGY

For purposes of applying the essential facilities doctrine
as an antitrust strategy for breaking up the airport monopolies, it is submitted that both the four MCI elements
can be satisand the Aspen intent test for monopolization
8 5
data.1
empirical
available
the
fied from
First, the empirical data clearly reveals that major airports in the United States are monopolies. Unlike the defendant railroads in Terminal Railroad, however, the
''monopolist" airport is technically a governmental entity
usually a municipality, authority, or county. In most
cases the state action doctrine will shield the governmental monopolist 8 6 who acts pursuant to statutory or regulatory authority. A conceptual analogy to Terminal Railroad
can be found, however, by noting that even though the
airport authority remains the fee owner of most airport
183797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986).
184

Id. at 379.

Note that there are no clear-cut solutions to regulate the biased use of CRSs.
The DOT may regulate these systems directly to ensure equal access to unbiased
services. Of course, this option has met with serious opposition from the CRS
owners. Traditional anti-trust theories are another option.
186 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
185
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facilities, the airlines exercise defacto control over airport
facilities through long-term leases and majority-in-interest clauses. We submit, however, that the lack of a fee
interest by the airlines is irrelevant to satisfying MCI requirements. In this regard it should be noted that the first
MCI requirement is "control of the facility by a monopolist," and not
"ownership of the facility by a
'8 7
monopolist."'
The second MCI requirement, "a competitor's inability
to duplicate the facility,"' 8 8 is easily established by taking
judicial notice of the large cost of building airports, and
the fact that most major metropolitan areas have no remaining available land for new airports. It is therefore
manifest that an airline excluded from a major airport
will, like the excluded railroads in Terminal Railroad, be
unable practically or reasonably
to duplicate the facility or
89
its economic function.
The third requirement, "denial of the use of a facility to
a competitor," is admittedly more problematic. 90 Certainly at those airports where insufficient gate or terminal
space is available to a competitor to conduct operations,
that competitor is effectively denied the use of the facility.
The question is, denied by whom? It is, of course, the
airport entity which makes the denial, not the incumbent
airline. Nevertheless, that denial is the direct result of the
airlines' effective control of the use of airport facilities
through its rights in long-term leases and majority-in-interest clauses. Since the airport and airline are both parties to such leases, there is joint action which results in the
denial of airport resources to the competitor. Furthermore, implicit in many leases is the assurance of an airline's exclusive use of an airport resource during the term
of the lease.' 9 1 In short, the data supports a finding that
8, See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
'88 Id.
"89

United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U.S. 383, 388 (1912).

-9 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
I'l This is in contrast to the practice at some European airports where gates are
rented either for short terms or for specific times during the day.
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denial of access at major hubs can be traced directly to
airport agreements entered into between the dominant
hub carrier and the airport.
The fourth requirement does pose an evidentiary problem. The "feasibility of providing the facility" must be
shown before the monopolist can be liable. 92 At first
blush, it would appear that the airport can do little in the
way of providing access if its gates and terminal space are
already leased out pursuant to long-term leases which are
legally enforceable. Furthermore, the airline is bound to
honor the lease and has no unilateral power to break the
lease.
There are two responses to this analysis. First, a court
might, in accordance with the Local Government Antitrust Act, enjoin an airport lacking Parker immunity from
renewing long-term leases unless it opens up the bidding
for such leases on a non-discriminatory basis, assuming
that the lease contains no right of renewal provisions.
Although many lease rentals are based on prior financial
commitments by the airlines, adjustments for such financial commitments could be taken into account in any open
bidding process ordered by a court or the DOT. With regard to the airline, however, it should be noted that most
leases permit the sublease of gates and terminal space.
Subleasing of gates, when done at all, is often done at exorbitant prices, which serve to raise a competitor's costs
to the point where effective competition is rendered impossible. Injunctive relief against an airline could, therefore, include an order requiring an airline to make a
reasonable number of gates and terminal space available
to competitors at a reasonable cost. Whether the incumbent airline is in fact using these facilities productively
would be a factor in determining the number of gates and
slots to be made available.
Finally, with regard to the general requirement of "intent to monopolize," we submit that there is sufficient em192

See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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pirical data to meet this requirement. The signing of
agreements containing majority-in-interest clauses, refusal to sublease gates or slots except at rates which unreasonably raise competitors' costs, resistance to the
building of new facilities or airports which might serve to
expand facilities available to competitors, and the action
taken by airlines during the past ten years in creating the
monopolistic "fortress hubs" - all provide the factual ' 9ba3
sis for a case to be made for "intent to monopolize."'
V.

CONCLUSION

Most of this country's major airports are monopolies or
duopolies at which one or two dominant carriers control a
high percentage of terminal facilities. Airlines have used
this market power to raise fares on flights originating and
terminating at such airports. Although this power has
been gained in part through the process of buy-outs and
mergers in the airline industry itself, it has also been
gained through actions taken in concert with airport authorities, such as when agreements are entered into that
effectively limit the availability of airport facilities to new
entrants and other competitors.
Airlines, by virtue of rights gained in their leases with
airports, have achieved effective control, if not fee ownership of airport facilities. We submit that they are, therefore, subject to antitrust action under section two of the
Sherman Act that makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of trade or commerce.""4 Specifically, the airlines' monopoly power
over airport resources should be broken up pursuant to
the essential facilities doctrine, which provides that any
company controlling an essential facility or a strategic
bottleneck, violates the antitrust laws if it fails to make access to that facility available to its competitor on fair and
reasonable terms. Although incumbent airlines have no
'o

See generally Part II.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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general "duty to deal" with competitors (i.e., by subleasing gates or terminal space) they are, even according to
such critics of the doctrine as Judge Posner, guilty of monopolization if they "refus[e] to cooperate with a competitor in circumstances where cooperation is indispensable
to effective competition."'' 95
It has been suggested that airlines should be permitted
to earn oligopoly profits as a means of solving their
chronic profitability problems, thus enabling them to obtain sufficient capital for new aircraft and equipment. It is
true that the airline industry today is an oligopoly, which
may in fact earn oligopoly profits. Whether that airline
oligopoly itself should be broken up, or whether antitrust
action should be taken to break up the airline industry itself is, of course, an entirely separate question not considered in this article.' 96 What is clear, however, is that the
earning of oligopoly profits through monopolization of
such essential facilities as airports, is anti-competitive and
results in a misallocation of resources. 97 It is also a violation of antitrust laws.

195

Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379

(7th Cir. 1986).
9 The deregulation of domestic airlines in 1978 failed to consider many of the
structural variables that resulted in sunk costs and barriers to entry. These permitted the incumbent airlines to develop market power through the use of the
hub-and-spoke network thereby discouraging entry into the industry. These factors played an important role in installing the "contestability" that was predicted
by deregulation's advocates.
Some of these barriers to entry have been the product of the ongoing process of
deregulation. Here, networking and information economics have made it impossible for new competitors to enter and survive in the industry. Other barriers
have been erected for the protection of particular airlines and not for the wellbeing of society. These practices must be recognized and counteracted with
sound economic and antitrust policy such that society will benefit from the deregulation of airlines.
It should be noted that no antitrust action should be taken merely on the basis
of market concentration. It is not possible for all trunks to coexist in a market
where the exploitation of economics of density, vis-a-vis the hub-and-spoke networks, yields a minimum efficient number of firms. The antitrust policy should be
aimed towards barriers to entry that give unfair advantages to incumbent firms.
197See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 555 (6th ed. 1990).
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